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We develop a new theory of international capital flows based on dispersed information across individual
investors. There is extensive evidence of information heterogeneity within and across countries, which
has proven critical to understanding asset price behavior. We introduce information dispersion into
an open economy dynamic general equilibrium portfolio choice model, and emphasize two implications
for capital flows that are specific to the presence of dispersed information. First, gross and net capital
flows become partially disconnected from publicly observed fundamentals. Second, capital flows (particularly
gross flows) contain information about future fundamentals, even after controlling for current fundamentals.
We find that these implications are quantitatively significant and consistent with data for industrialized
countries. 
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The sharp increase in both gross and net international capital ￿ ows over the past
two decades has lead to a renewed interest in understanding their driving forces.
Until not long ago most models of international capital ￿ ows were ill-equipped
to address these developments because they either limited international trade to a
riskfree bond or assumed complete ￿nancial markets. A new literature has recently
emerged to connect better with the empirical evidence through the development of
models that introduce portfolio choice into open economy DSGE environments.1
These models shed light on both net and gross capital ￿ ows (capital in￿ ows and
out￿ ows), and emphasize the role of time-varying risk and expected returns in
driving capital ￿ ows.
While these models represent substantial progress, they remain signi￿cantly at
odds with the data in one key respect. They assume that all agents have exactly
the same information, and therefore the same expected returns and perceived risk.
This is a major limitation for two reasons. First, there is extensive evidence on the
heterogeneity of information across investors. Most directly, survey evidence shows
that expectations about future macro fundamentals and asset prices di⁄er widely
across ￿nancial institutions and individuals. A substantial literature has also doc-
umented information di⁄erences across countries, with local investors having more
reliable information than foreign investors.2 Second, this heterogeneity plays a
central role in driving asset prices. Many features, such as the close link between
exchange rates and cumulative order ￿ ow documented by Evans and Lyons (2002),
can only be understood in the presence of dispersed information. The large market
microstructure literature in ￿nance has emphasized the implications of information
heterogeneity for asset prices and trading volume.3
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we develop a general equi-
librium theory of international capital ￿ ows under dispersed information that in-
tegrates key elements of the market microstructure literature in ￿nance and the
1Devereux and Sutherland (2007), Tille and van Wincoop (2008) and Evans and Hnatkovska
(2008) have developed tractable methods for solving such models.
2See for example Bae, Stulz and Tan (2007), who document that earnings forecasts are more
precise for local than foreign analysts. Section 2 of that paper provides a review of the evidence
on information asymmetries across countries. There is also evidence that agency problems are
better monitored by locals, e.g. Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2008).
3See Brunnermeier (2001) for a nice review of the literature.
1DSGE literature in macroeconomics. We adopt the two key features of noisy
rational expectations (NRE) models from the market microstructure literature.
First, agents have private information about future fundamentals. Second, there
is ￿noise￿in the form of unobserved portfolio shifts, which prevent asset prices
from fully revealing the private information. We integrate these features into a
two-country DSGE model where agents make decisions about portfolio allocation,
physical investment and saving.
Our second contribution is to confront the main implications of the theory to
the data. In the absence of private information capital ￿ ows are entirely driven by
publicly observed fundamentals (e.g. GDP growth, the budget de￿cit, in￿ ation).4
In our model capital ￿ ows are also driven by private information as it a⁄ects ex-
pectations of asset payo⁄s and portfolio allocation. This leads to two implications
that we confront to the data. First, capital ￿ ows are partially disconnected from
current publicly observed fundamentals. Second, capital ￿ ows help forecast future
fundamentals, even after controlling for their current values. This re￿ ects the role
of private information about future fundamentals. We con￿rm the quantitative
relevance of these implications through a calibration of the model. We also show
that these implications are consistent with data on aggregate capital ￿ ows for
industrialized countries.
Figure 1 provides the essence of the theoretical contribution. The model con-
tains four ingredients: information dispersion, portfolio choice, non-linearity and
general equilibrium structure. Standard macro DSGE models only contain the last
two ingredients. The recent contributions introducing portfolio choice in DSGE
models include the last three ingredients, but not the ￿rst one. By contrast, the
models in the market microstructure literature in ￿nance only contain the ￿rst two
ingredients. In particular, NRE models are not general equilibrium frameworks,
as they assume that there is an in￿nite supply of an asset with a constant riskfree
return.5 Moreover, they are entirely linear. While these aspects of NRE models
facilitate their solution, they do not ￿t well with the open economy DSGE setups
within which the literature on international capital ￿ ows is framed.
4This also includes public news variables that are featured in the literature on the impact of
news shocks, such as Beaudry and Portier (2003), Devereux and Engel (2006), Jaimovich and
Rebelo (2008) and Lorenzoni (2007).
5Even when assets with a riskfree return exist (e.g. Treasury bonds), in a general equilibrium
framework the demand for such assets must equate their ￿nite supply.
2We also make a methodological contribution by solving a DSGE model with
portfolio choice and information dispersion. We cannot directly rely on the re-
cently developed approximation methods for solving DSGE models with portfolio
choice, as they abstract from information dispersion. Neither can we directly ap-
ply the standard methods for solving NRE models because of the linear, partial
equilibrium, nature of these models. We develop a solution that extends the ap-
proximation methods used for solving DSGE models to encompass the key elements
from the method used for solving NRE models. Even though the combined pres-
ence of DSGE and NRE features makes the model quite rich, we are nonetheless
able to obtain an analytical solution. This facilitates transparency of the results.
The paper is related to a small set of papers that have introduced NRE asset
pricing features into open economy models. These include Albuquerque, Bauer and
Schneider (2007,2008), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004,2006), Brennan and Cao
(1997), Gehrig (1993) and Veldkamp and van Nieuwerburgh (2008). These papers
focus on a variety of issues, ranging from exchange rate puzzles to international
portfolio home bias and the relationship between asset returns and portfolio ￿ ows.
Together they show that information dispersion within and across countries can tell
us a lot about a wide range of stylized facts related to international asset prices and
portfolio allocation. However, none of these papers have implications for aggregate
capital in￿ ows and out￿ ows or even net capital ￿ ows (the current account). This
is not just because the focus is on other questions but more fundamentally because
these are not true general equilibrium models due to the presence of a riskfree asset
that is in in￿nite supply.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The solution
method is discussed in section 3. Section 4 derives implications for asset prices,
portfolio allocation and capital ￿ ows. This leads to two testable implications that
are confronted to the data in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
There are two countries, Home and Foreign, with a unit mass of atomistic agents in
each country. Both countries produce the same good using labor and capital. The
good can be used for consumption or investment, the latter entailing an adjustment
cost. We adopt a standard overlapping generation setup with agents living two
3periods. Young agents earn labor income and make consumption and portfolio
decisions. They can invest in claims on capital in both countries. While these
are claims on aggregate capital rather than residual claims, we refer to them as
Home and Foreign equity for convenience. Old agents consume the return on their
investment.
2.1 Production, Investment and Assets
The consumption good is taken as the numeraire. It is produced in both countries





i;t i = H;F (1)
where H and F denote the Home and Foreign country respectively. Yi is the
output in country i, Ai is a country-speci￿c exogenous stochastic productivity
term, Ki is the capital input and Ni the labor input that we normalize to unity.
Log productivity follows an autoregressive process:
ai;t+1 = ￿ai;t + "i;t+1 i = H;F
where "i;t+1 has a N(0;￿2
a) distribution and is uncorrelated across countries.
The dynamics of the capital stock re￿ ects depreciation at a rate ￿ and invest-
ment Ii;t:
Ki;t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Ki;t + Ii;t i = H;F (2)
A share ! of output is paid to labor, with the remaining going to capital. The
wage rate in country i is then
Wi;t = !Ai;t (Ki;t)
1￿! i = H;F (3)
Capital is supplied by a competitive installment ￿rm. In period t the install-
ment ￿rm produces Ii;t units of new capital and sells them at a price Qi;t that the
￿rm takes as given. The production of Ii;t units of capital good requires purchasing
Ii;t units of the consumption good and incurring a quadratic adjustment cost, so








4The pro￿t of installing Ii;t units of capital in country i is then Qi;tIi;t minus the








A unit of Home equity is a claim on a unit of Home capital. The equity price
is equal to the cost of purchasing one unit of capital from the installment ￿rm,
QH;t. An investor purchasing a unit of Home equity at the end of period t gets a
dividend of (1 ￿ !)YH;t+1=KH;t+1 in period t + 1, and can sell the remaining 1 ￿ ￿
units of equity at a price QH;t+1. The returns on Home and Foreign equity are
then
RH;t+1 =
(1 ￿ !)AH;t+1 (KH;t+1)




(1 ￿ !)AF;t+1 (KF;t+1)
￿! + (1 ￿ ￿)QF;t+1
QF;t
(7)
2.2 Private Information and Noise
We import the two key elements of NRE models: private information about future
fundamentals and noise that prevents asset prices from completely revealing the
private information. We introduce these elements to the model as follows.
Private Information
Each agent receives private signals about next period￿ s productivity innovations
in both countries. The signals observed by Home investor j about respectively the
log of Home and Foreign productivity are:
v
H;H
























Each signal consists of the true innovation and a stochastic error. Similarly, agent
j in the Foreign country observes the signals:
v
F;H
























As is standard in NRE models, we assume that the errors of the signals average








j;t dj = 0).
5Our setup is symmetric as the variance of signals on domestic productivity
is the same for agents in the two countries, and so is the variance of signals on
productivity abroad. We allow for an information asymmetry with agents receiving




Noise takes the form of unobserved portfolio shifts between assets for reasons
unrelated to expected returns. In the NRE literature the noise is usually simply
introduced exogenously in the form of noise trade or liquidity trade. Some papers
have introduced it endogenously in various forms of hedge trade and liquidity
trade.6 For our purposes the existence of a source of noise is more important than
the exact nature of it.
We introduce the noise through a time-varying cost of investing abroad. A
Home agent j investing in the Foreign country receives the return (7) times an
iceberg cost e￿￿Hj;t < 1. Similarly, a Foreign agent j investing in the Home country
receives the return (6) times an iceberg cost e￿￿Fj;t < 1. The cost of investment
abroad does not represent a loss in resources but is instead a fee paid to brokers
from the investor￿ s country.
This cost of investing abroad ￿ uctuates around a level ￿ that is the same for
all investors. The average cost ￿ generates portfolio home bias in the steady state
of the model, with agents tilting their holdings toward domestic assets. There are
two reasons for introducing portfolio home bias. First, it is a well known feature of
the data. Second, we will see that the impact of information dispersion on capital
￿ ows depends on the extent of portfolio home bias.
Fluctations around ￿ include both agent-speci￿c and country-speci￿c compo-
nents. The costs faced by Home investors in period t are distributed around an
average value ￿H;t = ￿ (1 + "￿
t), where "￿
t has a N(0;￿￿2
a) distribution. This av-
erage cost ￿H;t is unobserved. An individual investor making a portfolio decision
at time t knows her own cost ￿Hj;t, but we assume that this individual cost is
an in￿nitely noisy signal of the average cost. This assumption can be relaxed but
simpli￿es the analysis.7 The average cost in the Foreign country is ￿F;t = ￿(1￿"￿
t),
which is also unobserved. For simplicity, our speci￿cation implies that the average
6See for example Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006), Dow and Gorton (1995), Spiegel and
Subrahmanyam (1992) and Wang (1994).
7See Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) for a similar assumption.
6of ￿H;t and ￿F;t is constant, and focuses on movements in the relative cost between
the two countries. For instance, an increase in ￿D
t = ￿H;t ￿ ￿F;t = 2￿"￿
t leads to
a portfolio shift towards Home equity, as it is relatively more expensive for Home
investors to invest abroad than for Foreign investors. Such unobserved portfolio
shifts prevent the relative equity price from revealing private information.
2.3 Consumption and Portfolio Choice
Our assumption of an overlapping generation structure simpli￿es the model in
two ways. First, it removes the well-known pitfall in open economy models that
temporary income shocks can have a permanent e⁄ect on the distribution of wealth
across countries when agents have in￿nite lives. The ￿nite life assumption of OLG
models leads to a stationary distribution of wealth. Second, investors have only
a one period investment horizon and therefore do not face the issue of hedging
against changes in future expected returns.

















where Cy;t is consumption when young and Co;t+1 is consumption when old. We













t+1 = zHj;tRH;t+1 + (1 ￿ zHj;t)e
￿￿Hj;tRF;t+1 (13)
where zHj;t is the fraction of wealth invested in Home equity.
































(14) is the consumption Euler equation that links the marginal utility of current
consumption with the expected marginal utility of future consumption, including
the rate of return. (15) is the portfolio Euler equation that equates the expected
7discounted return (the expected product of the asset pricing kernel and asset re-
turns) across assets. The asset pricing kernel is the marginal utility of future
consumption, which is proportional to the return on the agent￿ s portfolio. A cen-
tral aspect of our model is that (14)-(15) are evaluated with expectations that can
di⁄er across individual agents.




￿￿Fj;tRH;t+1 + (1 ￿ zFj;t)RF;t+1 (16)

































The average portfolio shares invested by Home and Foreign investors in Home
equity are denoted zH;t =
R 1
0 zHj;tdj and zF;t =
R 1
0 zFj;tdj.
2.4 Asset and Goods Market Clearing
We assume that the brokers who receive the fees on investment abroad fully con-
sume it. Owners of the installment ￿rms also consume pro￿ts each period. The
goods market equilibrium condition is:






















y;t)(zFj;tRH;t+1 + (1 ￿ zFj;t)RF;t+1)dj
The left hand side is world output. The ￿rst two terms on the right hand side rep-
resent investment.8 The next two terms represent consumption by young agents.
The ￿nal two terms represent consumption by old agents and the brokers.9
8The installation cost does not enter. On the one hand it raises demand for the good (from
the installation process itself). On the other hand it reduces pro￿ts, and therefore consumption,
of the owners of installment ￿rms.
9The cost of investing abroad does not enter, as the income of the brokers exactly o⁄sets the
cost for old agents.
8Asset market clearing requires that the value of capital in a country is equal
to the value of holdings of the country￿ s equity by young agents. The ￿nancial
wealth of respectively a Home and Foreign agent j is WHt ￿ C
Hj
y;t and WFt ￿ C
Fj
y;t.






















y;t)(1 ￿ zFj;t)dj (20)
3 Solution Method
The solution combines and extends methods for solving standard NRE models
with a recently developed local approximation methods for solving DSGE models
with portfolio choice. NRE models are usually solved in three steps. The ￿rst step
involves a conjecture for the equilibrium asset price. The second step computes the
expectation of future asset payo⁄s by solving a signal extraction problem that uses
public and private information as well as information from the equilibrium asset
price. The last step invokes asset market equilibrium. The main di¢ culty here
will be in the last step as we need to impose not just asset market equilibrium but
the complete general equilibrium of the model in a highly non-linear environment.
We handle the last step by extending the local approximation method recently
developed by Devereux and Sutherland (2007) and Tille and van Wincoop (2008)
for DSGE models with portfolio choice. The method iteratively solves for the
various components of the variables. A variable xt can be decomposed into its
components of all orders. The zero-order component, denoted x(0), is the level of
xt when ￿a ! 0. The ￿rst-order component xt(1) is linear in model innovations,
or in the standard deviation ￿a of model innovations. Higher orders are de￿ned
analogously.
We discuss each of these three steps in broad terms. The algebra is described
further in the Appendix, with complete details left to a Technical Appendix that
is available on request. We use lower case letters for logs and superscripts A and
D to denote respectively the average and di⁄erence of a variable across the two
countries (xD = xH ￿ xF, xA = (xH + xF)=2).
93.1 Asset Price Conjecture
Only the relative equity price is a⁄ected by private information. The average
equity price is driven by global asset demand and therefore global saving, which
is not a⁄ected by private information. We make the following conjecture for the
relative log equity price qD
























depends on the unobserved state variables "D
t+1 and ￿D
t . Since we adopt a local
approximation method, described below, the conjecture (21) is veri￿ed locally up
to quadratic terms in observed and unobserved state variables.
The logic behind this conjecture is as follows. As in any DSGE model, the
solution for control variables (including asset prices) will be a function of state
variables. Usually these state variables are publicly observed. In our model this is
the case for the variables St. However, there are now also unobserved state vari-
ables, on which agents get noisy signals. We conjecture that the unobserved state
variables jointly a⁄ect the asset price through xD
t . The relative future productivity
innovation "D
t+1 should a⁄ect the relative asset price through private information.
The relative asset price should depend on ￿D
t as time variation in this relative
friction leads to portfolio shifts between Home and Foreign equity.
3.2 Signal Extraction
This conjecture signi￿cantly simpli￿es signal extraction. While the function f(:)
will be non-linear in xD
t , two aspects make simple linear signal extraction feasible.
First, we have conjectured (and will verify) that the relative asset price depends
on a variable xD
t that is linear in the unknowns "D
t+1 and ￿D
t . Second, locally qD
t
will depend on xD
t with a positive slope. This means that we can extract xD
t from
knowledge of the relative asset price qD
t and the publicly observed state space St.
10The asset price signal therefore translates into a signal that is linear in the future
fundamental ￿D
t+1 and the ￿noise￿￿D
t .
We then have three linear signals about next period￿ s technology innovations:
(i) the price signal, which tells us the level of "D
t+1 + ￿￿D
t =￿ from (23), (ii) the
private signals (8)-(11) and (iii) the public signals that "H;t+1 and "F;t+1 are drawn
from independent N(0;￿2
a) distributions. We solve this signal extraction problem
in Appendix B. It gives conditional normal distributions of "H;t+1 and "F;t+1 that
vary across agents. The expectation of future productivity innovations by agent j








































All coe¢ cients are de￿ned in Appendix B. The average expectation across Home
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(25)
where we used (8)-(11) and (23). Analogous results apply to Foreign agents. Av-
erage expectations of future productivity therefore depend on future productivity
levels themselves and on the noise ￿D
t . Through rational confusion an increases in
￿D
t raises the expectation of "D
t+1. This is because a rise in ￿D
t leads to a higher
relative price of Home equity, which agents use as a signal of future relative pro-
ductivity.
3.3 General Equilibrium
The ￿nal step in the solution of NRE models involves imposing asset market equi-
librium. In a DSGE model this step is more involved since we will need to invoke
the full general equilibrium of the model, including multiple asset market and
goods market clearing conditions and Euler equations for portfolio choice and con-
sumption. Moreover, we need to do so in a highly non-linear environment.
We adopt and extend the local approximation method for DSGE models with
portfolio choice developed by Devereux and Sutherland (2007) and Tille and van
Wincoop (2008), from hereon DS and TvW. It provides an exact solution to the
11zero, ￿rst and second-order components of control and state variables. The only
exception is zD
t = zH;t￿zF;t, for which the method delivers the zero and ￿rst-order
components.
The method distinguishes between the di⁄erence across countries in portfolio
Euler equations and all ￿other equations￿and similarly between the di⁄erence zD
t
across countries in portfolio allocation and all ￿other variables￿ . It ￿rst solves
for the zero-order component of zD
t and the ￿rst-order component of the ￿other
variables￿by jointly imposing the second-order component of the di⁄erence across
countries in portfolio Euler equations and the ￿rst-order component of the ￿other
equations￿ . This step is subsequently repeated one order higher for all equations
and variables in order to obtain the ￿rst-order component of zD
t jointly with the
second-order component of all ￿other variables￿ . We refer to DS and TvW for
detailed descriptions of the method.
In implementing and extending the method to our model, three issues need to
be addressed that are speci￿c to the introduction of information dispersion. These
involve the order component of the errors of the private signals, the computation
of expectations of equations and the computation of the parameter ￿ that captures
the noise to signal ratio in the relative asset price in equation (23).
Errors in Private Signals
We assume that ￿2
HH and ￿2
HF are zero-order. It is important to distinguish
between the volatility of the innovations in the model, captured by ￿2
a, and the
uncertainty of the private signals about these innovations, captured by ￿2
HH and
￿2
HF. We keep these two dimensions distinct. A reduction in the volatility of
innovations is then not accompanied by an increased precision of the signals on
the innovations.
This assumption implies that the private signals (8)-(11) entail a zero-order
component (the errors of the signals) and a ￿rst-order component (the true future
productivity innovations). In Appendix B we show that it implies that the coef-








"F;vF, are of order
two. Di⁄erences in expected returns across individual investors are then second
order, as they combine these second-order coe¢ cients with the zero-order errors of
the private signals in (8)-(11). The di⁄erences in expected returns being small, of
order two or higher, ensures that the cross-sectional distribution of portfolio shares
does not explode when risk becomes small. This is because expected returns are
12divided by the variance of the excess return in the optimal portfolios. If errors in
private signals were ￿rst-order, di⁄erences in expectations would be ￿rst-order as
well and the distribution of portfolio shares would explode for low levels of risk.
For the same reason we assume that the average cost ￿ of investment abroad is
second-order.
Computing Expectations
Consider the expected value of a term eq, which consists of one or several
variables, E eq. In common knowledge models, computing the second-order com-
ponent of this expectation simply entails taking the expectation of the second-order
component of eq, so that [E eq](2) = E[eq(2)]. This is no longer the case here
though,10 and we need to be careful to ￿rst compute expectations of equations be-
fore splitting them into components of di⁄erent orders. To compute expectations
of equations, both the equations and the solution of control variables need to be in
polynomial form. It is su¢ cient to use an o-order polynomial approximation when
the goal is to compute the o-order component of an equation or variable.
Equations are written as polynomials in St, xD
t , xD
t+1 and "t+1 = ("H;t+1;"F;t+1)0.
Control variables are conjectured as polynomial solutions in the observed and
unobserved state variables St and xD
t . A quadratic polynomial conjecture for the
control variables is su¢ cient as we will only solve zero, ￿rst and second-order
components of control variables. We therefore conjecture (for h = D;A)11
q
h











































Expectations of equations are computed using the results from signal extrac-
tion. Invoking the order components of equations as in DS and TvW will then give
the zero and ￿rst-order components of the parameters ￿ (with various subscripts)
in (26)-(28) and the zero-order component of all the other parameters.
10As an example, "H;t+1(2) = 0, so that Et["H;t+1(2)] = 0. But Et("H;t+1) has a non-zero
second-order component as the weight attached to private signals is of order two and higher.
11No conjectures will be needed for zD
t and zA
t . After all ￿other variables￿are solved up to
second order, zD
t (1) follows from the third-order component of the di⁄erence in portfolio Euler
equations and zA
t (1), zA
t (2) follow from the ￿rst and second-order components of the di⁄erence
of the asset market clearing conditions.
13Computing ￿
In NRE models the signal to noise ratio ￿ in (23) can be solved by imposing
asset market equilibrium. A version of that applies here as well. We need to
impose the di⁄erence between the two asset market clearing conditions (19)-(20).
This relates the average share invested in Home equity, zA
t , to the share of Home
equity supply. Combining the ￿rst-order components of (26)-(28) with that of
(19)-(20) solves zA
t (1) by equating it to the ￿rst-order component from the supply
side. In order to actually impose market equilibrium we need to compute zA
t (1)
from a portfolio or demand perspective as well. This is done by using the third-
order component of the average of the Euler equations for portfolio choice, (15)
and (18). Equating zA
t (1) from the demand side to the Home equity share from
the supply side yields a solution for ￿, as shown in Appendix C.
4 Asset Prices, Portfolio Allocation and Capital
Flows
In this section we discuss the ￿rst-order solution of asset prices, optimal portfolio
shares and capital ￿ ows.
4.1 Asset Prices
The ￿rst-order solution of the relative asset price is
q
D





t + ￿3;qD (0)k
D









with all parameters positive. The relative asset price is therefore driven by both
publicly observed state variables, aD
t and kD
t , and by unobserved state variables "D
t+1
and ￿D
t . Both of these unobserved state variables generate a disconnect between
asset prices and publicly observed fundamentals, a fact that is widely documented.
In the absence of information dispersion the relative asset price would, to the
￿rst-order, be entirely determined by the publicly observed state variables St. This
is because future productivity innovations cannot a⁄ect current equilibrium asset
prices, and shocks to ￿D
t only have a third-order e⁄ect on asset prices. Recall that
a rise in ￿D
t = 2￿"￿
t is third-order. This leads to a third-order increase in the
14expected excess return on Home equity. In order to clear ￿nancial markets there
needs to be a third-order drop in the expected excess return on Home equity, which
takes place through a third-order rise in the Home equity price.
At ￿rst it may seem surprising that ￿D
t and "D
t+1 have a ￿rst-order e⁄ect on
asset prices when we introduce information dispersion. As discussed above, shocks
to ￿D
t are third-order. (25) also shows that private information alone leads to
third-order changes in average expectations about "D
t+1, as ￿rst-order innovations
are combined with the second-order coe¢ cients on private signals.
The ￿rst-order impact of ￿D
t and "D
t+1 in (29) re￿ ects the role of the relative
asset price as an information coordination mechanism. Imagine that agents ig-
nored qD
t as a source of information. The impact of ￿D
t and "D
t+1 would then be
third-order as discussed above. But because both are of the same order in their
impact on the relative asset price, it would imply that the price contains much
more precise information about "D
t+1 than the private signals. After all, in the
private signals the error terms are much larger (zero-order) than the productivity
innovations themselves (￿rst-order). It is this feature that explains why in equilib-
rium the weight attached to the price signal in expectations of future productivity
innovations is much larger (zero-order) than the weight attached to private signals
(second-order).
The zero-order weight attached to the price signal implies that changes in ￿D
t
and "D
t+1 have a ￿rst-order e⁄ect on the expectation of "H;t+1 and "F;t+1, which leads
to a ￿rst-order e⁄ect on asset prices.12 It is through the information coordination
role of the price signal that agents learn a lot more about "D
t+1, amplifying its
impact from third to ￿rst-order. The impact of the noise ￿D
t is also ampli￿ed from
third to ￿rst-order as it a⁄ects the expectation of future productivity innovations
through the price signal (rational confusion). This ampli￿ed e⁄ect of the noise
can make a huge di⁄erence. For example, Gennotte and Leland (1990) provide
evidence that during the U.S. stock market crash of October 19, 1987, the impact
of non-informational trade (noise) on the U.S. stock price was ampli￿ed by a factor
greater than 100 as a result of the information content of the stock price.




￿F;xD that multiply xD
t
in the expectations of future productivity innovations.
154.2 Portfolio Allocation
We now discuss the implications of the model for portfolio allocation, a key deter-
minant of international capital ￿ ows. We present the results in terms of the average
portfolio share invested in Home equity, zA
t , and the di⁄erence across countries in
the portfolio share invested in Home equity, zD
t , considering both their zero and
￿rst-order components.
In terms of zero-order components, the asset market clearing conditions (19)-
(20) imply that zA(0) = 0:5. The di⁄erence in zero-order portfolio shares, zD(0),
which represents portfolio home bias, is computed from the second-order compo-
nent of the di⁄erence in portfolio Euler equations (15) and (18), and re￿ ects the










where ert+1 = rH;t+1 ￿ rF;t+1 is the di⁄erence in log returns or excess return.
We obtain expressions for the ￿rst-order component of the average and di⁄er-
ence in optimal portfolio shares from the third-order component of respectively

















































t denotes the average expectation across agents from both countries and
￿ Eh
t the average expectations across agents from country h (h = H;F).
The ￿rst-order component of zA
t is driven by three intuitive elements in (31).
First, a rise in ￿D
t (3) leads to a portfolio shift towards Home equity as the cost of
investment abroad rises for Home relative to Foreign investors. Second, a higher
average expected excess return ert+1 on Home equity net of ￿nancial frictions also
leads to a portfolio shift towards Home equity. The last term in (31) represents
time-variation in second moments, which are captured by their third-order compo-
13See Appendix C and D and the Technical Appendix for full derivations.
16nents.14 A rise in the variance of the Home return relative to that of the Foreign
equity return leads to a shift towards Foreign equity (assuming ￿ > 1).
The expression (32) for the di⁄erence zD
t (1) in portfolio shares captures time-
variation in portfolio home bias. It is driven by two factors. First, an increase in
the expected excess return on Home equity by Home investors relative to Foreign
investors will lead to increased home bias. Second, an increase in the variance
of the excess return reduces home bias. There is a tradeo⁄ between investing at
home due to the friction ￿ and achieving the gains from portfolio diversi￿cation. A
higher variance of the excess return makes diversi￿cation more attractive, reducing
home bias.
In the Technical Appendix we show that these moments a⁄ecting zD
t (1) take
the form:


















where the parameters ￿i are zero-order and follow from the ￿rst and second-order
solutions of the ￿other variables￿ . To understand (33), assume that ￿2
HH < ￿2
HF, so
that agents have better quality signals about their domestic equity market. When
productivity levels rise in both countries next period, agents from both countries
expect that productivity in their own country will rise more because they have
better quality information about their own productivity. As a result they both
expect the return on their own country￿ s equity to rise relative to that of the other
country, which leads to increased portfolio home bias (￿1 > 0). (34) implies that
changes in the variance of the excess return over time are driven only by changes
in publicly observed state variables.15
4.3 International Capital Flows
After some straightforward balance of payments accounting outlined in Appendix
E, and using the results on portfolio allocation discussed above, we obtain the
14See Tille and van Wincoop (2008) for a further discussion of this.
15Only the second and fourth elements of ￿2 are non-zero, so that only global state variables
a⁄ect the variance of the excess return.
17following expressions for capital out￿ ows and in￿ ows:








































































The terms on the right hand side are related to saving, expected returns and risk.
For each of them we now discuss their intuitive meaning and determinants.
Portfolio Growth
The ￿rst term on the right hand side of (35)-(36) represents portfolio growth,
which measures out￿ ows and in￿ ows when Home and Foreign saving are invested
abroad at the steady state portfolio share 1￿zH(0). The portfolio growth compo-
nent depends entirely on Home and Foreign saving, which can be written as
s
H










where ￿sH and ￿sF are zero-order vectors. Home and Foreign saving depend both
on changes in publicly observed state variables and changes in relative asset prices.
The latter generate wealth e⁄ects that impact consumption of the old generations.
When the relative price of Home equity rises, the old generation in the Home
country will be relatively wealthy and will consume this additional wealth. This
lowers Home saving.
Time-Varying Risk
The other three terms driving capital in￿ ows and out￿ ows (35)-(36) are a result
of portfolio reallocation due to changes in risk and expected returns. The second
term represents capital ￿ ows due to changes in the variance of the excess return.
An increase in the variance of the excess return makes portfolio diversi￿cation
more attractive and therefore leads to an increase in both capital in￿ ows and
out￿ ows. As can be seen from (34), the variance of the excess return only depends
18on publicly observed state variables. Time variation in the variance of the Home
return relative to that of the Foreign return does not a⁄ect capital ￿ ows. From
(31), we see that these moments only a⁄ect average portfolio shares. When there
is an average shift towards Home equity, the market will equilibrate through a
third-order rise in the relative Home equity price. This leads to a third-order drop
in the expected excess return on Home equity, causing a ￿rst-order portfolio shift
back towards Foreign equity.16 In the end capital ￿ ows remain una⁄ected.
Average Expected Excess Return
The third term on the right hand side of (35)-(36) represents capital ￿ ows due to
the average change in the expected excess return. As discussed in detail in Tille and
van Wincoop (2008), not all changes in expected excess returns generate capital
￿ ows. We have already discussed the example above where changes in expected
returns equilibrate asset markets when there are time-varying second moments.
No capital ￿ ows result from this. Another example is the adjustment following a
rise in the relative price of Home equity. This raises the relative supply of Home
equity and a third-order increase in the expected excess return on Home equity is
necessary for investors to be willing to accept this shift in the composition of their
portfolio. But no capital ￿ ows take place as a rise in the relative Home asset price
automatically changes the portfolio composition without any asset trade.
The Technical Appendix derives all of the components determining changes in
the equilibrium expected excess return. The only one that a⁄ects capital ￿ ows is
denoted with an IS superscript in (35) and (36). It is related to changes in saving




















When relative investment is high in the Home country, it raises the relative supply
of Home equity. A higher expected excess return on Home equity is then needed
to clear asset markets. This leads to increased capital in￿ ows and lower capital
out￿ ows. When relative saving in Home is high, there will be an excess demand for
Home equity due to portfolio home bias. A lower expected excess return is then
needed to clear asset markets, which leads to larger out￿ ows and smaller in￿ ows.
16As can be seen from (31) and (32), third-order changes in expected returns lead to ￿rst-order
portfolio shifts as they are divided by a second-order variance of the excess return.
19Cross-country di⁄erences in saving and investment are equal to
s
D
t (1) = ￿a
D
t (1) + (1 ￿ !)￿k
D












Relative asset prices a⁄ect relative saving through a wealth e⁄ect and relative
investment through a standard Tobin￿ s Q equation.
Di⁄erences in Expected Returns across Countries
The last term driving capital out￿ ows and in￿ ows in (35) and (36) represents
changes in the average expected excess return of Home investors relative to Foreign
investors. When investors from both countries become more optimistic about the
expected excess return on their domestic equity, both capital out￿ ows and in￿ ows
will drop. As can be seen from (33), this will happen when there is a positive future
world productivity innovation "A
t+1 and investors have better quality information
about domestic productivity innovations. Investors from both countries then be-
lieve that their own relative productivity will rise as they have better information
on that, leading to a retrenchment towards domestic assets.
Impact of Information Dispersion on Capital Flows
In analyzing the impact of information dispersion on capital ￿ ows we will dis-
tinguish between gross capital ￿ ows, de￿ned as out￿ ows plus in￿ ows, and net
capital ￿ ows, de￿ned as out￿ ows minus in￿ ows. The latter is also equal to the
current account.17 In the absence of information dispersion capital ￿ ows (35)-(36)
are entirely determined by the publicly observed state variables St(1). Even unob-
served portfolio shifts associated with ￿D
t do not have a ￿rst-order e⁄ect on capital
￿ ows in that case. A ￿rst-order portfolio shift from Foreign to Home leads to a
third-order increase in the Home relative equity price. This leads to a third-order
drop in the expected excess return on Home equity, which generates an entirely
o⁄setting ￿rst-order portfolio shift back from Home to Foreign.
With dispersed information both gross and net capital ￿ ows are also a⁄ected
by state variables that are not publicly observed. Figure 2 illustrates the channels
through which this happens. The arrows on the left hand side of Figure 2 illustrate
17It is easily seen from (35)-(36) that outflowst(1)￿inflowst(1) = 0:5(sD
t (1)￿iD
t (1)). Using
the equality sH + sF = iH + iF, this is equal to sH
t (1) ￿ iH
t (1), which is the current account.
20the impact of the unobserved state variables ￿D
t and "D
t+1 on net capital ￿ ows. We
have already seen that they have a ￿rst-order e⁄ect on the relative asset price qD
t
in the presence of private information. This a⁄ects saving and investment through
a wealth e⁄ect and a Tobin￿ s Q e⁄ect, which in turn a⁄ects net capital ￿ ows both
through changes in the equilibrium expected excess return and through portfolio
growth.18
The right hand side of Figure 2 illustrates the impact of the unobserved state
variable "A
t+1 on gross capital ￿ ows. A rise in "A
t+1 leads agents from both countries
to become more optimistic about the relative return on the asset from their own
country. The resulting retrenchment leads to a drop in both capital in￿ ows and
out￿ ows and therefore gross ￿ ows.
We can summarize these results in the form of two implications that capture
the impact of dispersed information on both gross and net capital ￿ ows:
Implication 1 Capital ￿ows are partially disconnected from current publicly ob-
served fundamentals.
Implication 2 Capital ￿ows help forecast future fundamentals, even after control-
ling for current fundamentals.
Discussion
Implications 1 and 2 are broader than the speci￿cs of our model. They do not
really depend on assumptions we made about the production side of the economy
or preferences. The OLG assumption is not key either. It is only a tractable device
to generate stationarity of the equilibrium. The implications also do not depend on
how we introduced the noise in the economy through the cost of investing abroad;
we could simply have introduced exogenous noise traders. The key assumption
that drives Implications 1 and 2 is dispersed information. The speci￿cs of how we
introduced dispersed information are not important. We could for example have
assumed that agents have private information about fundamentals further than
18To some extent these e⁄ects depend on portfolio home bias, which a⁄ects the impact of
relative asset price changes on Home and Foreign saving and the impact of relative saving on the
average expected excess return. See (37), (38) and (39).
21one period into the future, as in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006, 2008),19 or
that within each country there are informed and uninformed agents (e.g. Wang
(1994)).
While generalizing the model should not qualitatively change the impact of
dispersed information as summarized in Implications 1 and 2, additional channels
through which these implications come about are certainly possible. One example
is an extension where agents work both periods of their life and have private
information about their future labor income. Expectations of future labor income
a⁄ect saving decisions, which a⁄ects capital ￿ ows through portfolio growth and
the average expected excess return. Implication 1 will hold as this is private
information. Implication 2 will hold as well as it is information about future labor
income. This example also illustrates that asset prices are not necessarily the only
channel through which private information can a⁄ect net capital ￿ ows.
One may also ask whether there are other models, without information disper-
sion, that lead to Implications 1 and 2. We have already seen that unobserved
exogenous portfolio shifts ￿D
t do not have a ￿rst-order e⁄ect on asset prices and
capital ￿ ows in the absence of private information. It is possible though to generate
a disconnect by allowing for asset price bubbles, which we have ruled out. But this
would only impact net, not gross capital ￿ ows. Moreover, it would be inconsistent
with the second implication of the model as bubbles have no information content.
A ￿nal possibility may be that there is publicly available news about future
fundamentals that is not controlled for by the econometrician. In that case Impli-
cations 1 and 2 would appear to hold even when there is no information dispersion.
Such an argument has long been around to explain the disconnect been exchange
rates and publicly observed fundamentals. However, this argument has been put
to rest by the contributions of Evans and Lyons (2002) and others that document
a close connection between exchange rates and order ￿ ow. This connection would
not exist if all information is public as order ￿ ow aggregates private information.
Public news a⁄ects asset prices without any order ￿ ow at all.20
19Such an extension, as well as others, does not fundamentally change the solution method
other than that a larger model with more state variables would call for a numerical rather than
analytic solution. As shown in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006,2008), when agents have private
information about fundamentals more than one period into the future asset prices are e⁄ected by
higher order expectations of future fundamentals, but this does not change the solution method.
20Public news can lead to order ￿ ow if agents disagree about the interpretation of the news.
But that is another example of private information, in this case about the nature or parameters
225 Quantitative Assessment
We now evaluate the quantitative relevance of the two implications of the model,
taking two complementary approaches. We ￿rst calibrate the model to data for
6 industrialized countries. This gives a good quantitative sense of the two impli-
cations within the context of the model and of the sensitivity to key parameters
(extent of information dispersion, extent of information asymmetry and the extent
of noise). The precise results will of course be sensitive to a variety of simpli-
fying assumptions we made to obtain analytic tractability and transparency of
the results. We therefore compliment the calibration results with an additional
quantitative assessment that does not rely on the speci￿c functional forms of the
model.
The second approach uses regression analysis and Granger causality tests for
the same 6 industrialized countries to quantify the extent of disconnect between
capital ￿ ows and publicly observed fundamentals and the ability of capital ￿ ows to
predict future asset payo⁄s conditional on observed fundamentals. This model free
approach is useful because we have argued that Implications 1 and 2 of dispersed
information apply more generally than to the speci￿c model used here. Therefore
we do not limit ourselves to the observed state variables St in the model, but
instead consider a broader set of observed macro variables.
It is also useful to explain what we will not do when evaluating the empirical
relevance of the model. First, we do not take the expressions (35)-(36) for capital
out￿ ows and in￿ ows to the data. Such expressions can also be derived in the
absence of information dispersion.21 Information dispersion is only relevant to the
extent that it impacts the various components of capital ￿ ows in (35)-(36), which
leads to the two implications that we will focus on. Second, we do not use data on
order ￿ ow. While such data have convincingly shown that asset prices aggregate
private information, data on capital ￿ ows are not available at a daily frequency
that would make such an analysis fruitful.
of the model.
21In the absence of information dispersion the last terms in (35)-(36) are obviously zero as
expectations are identical across Home and Foreign agents.
235.1 Calibration Results
We calibrate the model to annual data over the period 1977-2006 for the United
States, Japan, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany and France, with the data
sources described in Appendix F. Starting with the parameters related to produc-
tion, we set the labor share ! equal to 0.54, which is the average ratio of employee
compensation to GDP in our sample. We estimate the persistence ￿ in the sto-
chastic process for productivity by computing the Solow residuals and estimating
a panel regression of ait on its own lag and country-speci￿c constants. This yields
an estimate of ￿ of 0.91. It also yields an estimate of the standard deviation ￿a of
productivity innovations, but all moments we report below will be independent of
the scale ￿a of innovations.
The last two parameters associated with the supply side of the economy are
the adjustment cost parameter ￿ and the rate of depreciation ￿. We set ￿ equal
to 2.7 in order to match the standard deviation of annual real investment growth
relative to the standard deviation of annual real GDP growth. This ratio is 2.8
in the data when averaged across the 6 countries and the sample 1977-2006. We
set the rate of depreciation ￿ equal to 0.1, which is the standard assumption for
annual data in the entire real business cycle literature (e.g. Backus, Kehoe and
Kydland (1992)).
We choose the average cost ￿ of investment abroad in order to match the
observed portfolio home bias in the data. The standard measure of portfolio home
bias is
1 ￿
share of foreign equity in portfolio of domestic investors
share of foreign equity in world portfolio
Fidora, Fratzscher and Thimann (2007) report this measure of home bias for a wide
range of countries based on 2001-2003 data. This includes 5 of our industrialized
countries (all but Canada). The average measure of home bias for those 5 countries
is 0.73. They also report a measure of home bias for debt securities, which is
virtually identical. We therefore set the cost ￿ of investment abroad such that the
zero-order component of portfolio home bias in the model is equal to 0.73.22 The
level of ￿ depends on the rate of relative risk-aversion, which we set at 5. Holding
22In the steady state of our symmetric setup this measure of home bias is also equal to zD(0).
We set ￿ in the expression (30) for zD(0) to match the 0.73 home bias in the data. It implies
that both countries invest a fraction 0.865 in domestic equity.
24the home bias constant, a change in the rate of risk-aversion has little e⁄ect on the
results reported below.
While the parameters outlined above are standard in the literature, we also
need to set values for three parameters that are speci￿c to our model. These
are the average dispersion of private signals across investors, (￿HH + ￿HF)=2, the
relative precision of signals on domestic and foreign innovations, ￿HF=￿HH, and
the volatility of noise shocks relative to productivity innovations, ￿.
We set the average dispersion of private signals, (￿HH +￿HF)=2, to generate a
cross-sectional dispersion of expected asset price changes that matches the evidence
from surveys of forecasters. More speci￿cally, we match the standard deviation of
the cross-sectional distribution of E
Hj
t qH
t+1, scaled by the unconditional variance of
￿qH
t . The advantage of scaling the cross-sectional distribution this way is that the
result in the model does not depend on the scale of model innovations measured
by ￿a.
We measure the dispersion of expected asset price changes by using a survey
from the International Center for Finance at the Yale School of Management that
reports expected stock price changes by a large number of ￿nancial institutions.23
The survey has data for two countries, the United States and Japan. For both
countries the survey asks about expected percentage change in the stock price
(respectively Dow Jones Industrial Index and Nikkei Dow) over the next 1, 3, and
12 months, with our parametrization focusing on the 1-year ahead forecasts. For
each country the survey is based on about 400 ￿nancial institutions.24 The survey
starts in 1989 with six-month interval surveys until 1998, after which monthly
surveys are conducted.25 We have collected the data through October 2004.
Since it is important to compare expectations at the same point in time, and
￿nancial institutions do not all respond to the survey on the same day, we only
consider the cross sectional distribution of responses that take place on the same
23We would like to thank the International Center for Finance for making these data available
to us.
24For Japan the survey is mailed to most of the major ￿nancial institutions, including 165
banks, 46 insurance companies, 113 security companies and 45 investment trust companies. For
the U.S. about 400 randomly drawn institutions are selected from ￿Investment Managers ￿ in the
￿Money Market Directory of Pension Funds and their Investment Managers ￿ .
25See Shiller et al. (1996) and http://icf.som.yale.edu/con￿dence.index/explanations.html for
more details.
25day.26 The average cross-sectional standard deviation of the expected one-year
percentage stock price change across respondents is 0.1278 for the U.S. and 0.1341
for Japan. This is scaled by the variance of stock price changes. Here we use
historical numbers of the standard deviation of stock price changes from Jorion
and Goetzmann (1999), which are respectively 0.1584 and 0.1579 for the U.S. and
Japan. Our scaled measure of dispersion of expected stock price changes is then
4.99 for the U.S. and 5.23 for Japan. In the model we set (￿HH + ￿HF)=2 = 0:22,
which leads to a scaled measure of dispersion of expected stock price changes of
5.03, close to that for both the U.S. and Japan.
As ￿HF=￿HH and ￿ are hard to calibrate, we vary them over a wide range. Un-
der the benchmark we set ￿ = 100 and ￿HF=￿HH = 1:5. Holding (￿HH+￿HF)=2 =
0:22 remains broadly consistent with the evidence on information dispersion even
when we vary ￿ and ￿HF=￿HH over a wide range.27
The results are reported in 6 panels in Figure 3. The top 3 panels relate to
Implication 1. They report the fraction of the variance of gross and net capital
￿ ows explained by unobserved state variables, as a function of respectively (￿HH +
￿HF)=2, ￿HF=￿HH and ￿. The bottom three panels relate to Implication 2, and
report the R2 of a regression of "D
t+1 on net capital ￿ ows at time t and "A
t+1 on gross
capital ￿ ows at time t.
For the benchmark parameterization the fraction of the variance of both gross
and net capital ￿ ows explained by unobserved state variables is 49%.28 As ex-
pected, panel A shows that the disconnect gradually disappears when the standard
deviation of the errors in the signals becomes large. In that case the private signals
have little information content and the dispersion of information goes away. The
scaled measure of cross-sectional dispersion of expectations of asset price changes
(not reported) goes to zero as well.
Panel B shows the disconnect as a function of the extent of information asym-
metry across countries. This is not relevant for net capital ￿ ows, but the disconnect
for gross capital ￿ ows relies entirely on the information asymmetry. We see that
26Moreover, we eliminate days were there were fewer than 5 responses.
27The scaled measure of dispersion of expected stock price changes varies from 4.3 to 5.6 when
varying ￿HF=￿HH from 1.01 to 2. The range is 3.8 to 6.4 when we vary ￿ from 1 to 1000.
28The disconnect would be even larger if we had introduced private information about fun-
damentals further into the future and persistence of the noise in the model. Both features are
present in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) in the context of a NRE model for exchange rate
determination.
26introducing only a very small degree of information asymmetry is su¢ cient to get
close to the full impact on disconnect. It makes little di⁄erence for the disconnect
whether ￿HF is 5% or 100% higher than ￿HH.29
Panel C shows that the disconnect is virtually independent of the variance of
the noise, which is proportional to ￿. We report results for ￿ ranging from 1 to
1000. A higher ￿ reduces the contribution of "D
t+1 to the variance of net capital
￿ ows while raising the contribution of the noise ￿D
t , leaving the overall contribution
of these unobserved state variables almost unchanged. The reduced contribution
of "D
t+1 is a result of the reduced information content of the relative asset price due
to the increased noise. Therefore less is known about "D
t+1.
Turning to Implication 2 of the model, panel D shows that the information
content of both net and gross capital ￿ ows is negatively related to the standard
deviaton of the errors of the private signals. It goes to zero when the private
signals become very weak (panel D). More interesting though is the di⁄erence in
the information content when comparing gross and net capital ￿ ows. The last
two panels show that the explanatory power of gross capital ￿ ows at t for "A
t+1 is
quite robust. Panel E shows that only a small degree of information asymmetry is
required, while panel F shows that it is not sensitive to ￿.
By contrast, the explanatory power of net capital ￿ ows at t for "D
t+1 is much
more limited and less robust. This is due to the noise, which only a⁄ects net
capital ￿ ows and reduces its information content. Panel F shows that introducing
more noise through a higher ￿ quickly evaporates the information content of net
capital ￿ ows. The R2 of a regression of ￿D
t+1 on net capital ￿ ows declines rapidly
with ￿. This is a result both of the increased importance of the noise and the
reduced weight of ￿D
t+1 due to the lower information content of the relative asset
price.
29Even under the benchmark parameterization, where ￿HF=￿HH = 1:5, the average absolute
forecast error of Home productivity innovations is only 0.14% higher for Foreign investors than
for Home investors (based on the estimated ￿a = 0:0127). To provide some perspective, Bae,
Stulz and Tan (2007) report that the absolute forecast error of annual earnings per share is 7.8%
higher for foreign analysts than local analysts. This is not fully comparable to our model though
as it refers to earnings forecasts of individual ￿rms rather than the entire economy. Nonetheless
it shows that the extent of information asymmetry in the model is not excessive by any means.
275.2 Evidence from Six Industrialized Countries
5.2.1 Disconnect from Publicly Observed Fundamentals
We now turn to a model free approach to evaluating Implications 1 and 2. For
the ￿rst implication of the model, we estimate a VAR to evaluate the explanatory
power of innovations in macro variables for capital ￿ ow ￿ uctuations over various
horizons. We use quarterly data from 1977(1) to 2007(2), and report results for
both gross and net capital ￿ ows. Gross capital ￿ ows are again de￿ned as out￿ ows
plus in￿ ows and net capital ￿ ows as out￿ ows minus in￿ ows. We measure the latter
as the current account in most of the results reported, but ￿ndings are similar when
measured using ￿nancial ￿ ows. Capital ￿ ows are expressed as a share of GDP.
For gross capital ￿ ows we estimate a VAR that includes the following variables:
world GDP growth, world in￿ ation, world interest rate (T-bill rate), world budget
de￿cit (share of GDP) and gross capital ￿ ows. All world variables are computed as
a GDP-weighted average of the variables across all countries. For net capital ￿ ows
we estimate a VAR that includes: relative GDP growth, relative in￿ ation, relative
T-bill rate, relative budget de￿cit (share of GDP) and net capital ￿ ows. Relative
refers to the di⁄erence between the variable in the country minus a GDP-weighted
average of that in the other countries. Identi￿cation of the innovations is achieved
using the Choleski decomposition with the ordering of the variables as listed above.
Three lags of all variables are included in the VAR.
The results are reported in Table 1. The macro variables have very limited
explanatory power for gross capital ￿ ows. At a one-quarter horizon only 6% of the
variance of gross capital ￿ ows can be accounted for by innovations in the macro
variables. Even at a 12-quarter horizon only 16% of the variance of gross capital
￿ ows is explained by innovations in the macro variables. Results are only slightly
better for the current account, where respectively 7% and 32% of the variance of
the current account at 1 and 12-quarter horizons can be explained by innovations
in publicly observed macro variables.
These results are consistent with the ￿rst implication of the model. It is possi-
ble though that the limited explanatory power of publicly observed macro variables
is due to measurement error in both gross and net capital ￿ ow data. Such mea-
surement error is likely to be much more severe for quarterly data than for annual
data. In the remainder of this section we therefore focus the analysis on annual
data. In Table 2 we repeat the previous exercise using 30 annual observations
28from 1977 to 2006, including only one lag in the VAR. Consistent with the view
that capital ￿ ows are better measured for annual than for quarterly data, we now
￿nd that a larger fraction of capital ￿ ow ￿ uctuations can be accounted for by the
macro variables. For gross capital ￿ ows we ￿nd that respectively 21% and 30%
of the variance is explained by innovations in the macro variables at 1 and 3-year
horizons. For the current account these numbers are 34% and 53%.
But this still leaves most gross and net capital ￿ ow ￿ uctuations unexplained.
Moreover, this signi￿cantly overstates the true explanatory power of publicly ob-
served macroeconomic variables because of the relatively small sample of 30 annual
observations. It needs to be compared to what we would get when the macro vari-
ables are generated by pure noise. In order to make this comparison, for each
country we generate an arti￿cial series of macro variables from an AR(1) process
with the same persistence as the actual macro variables for that country and ran-
domly generated N(0;1) innovations. We then compute the average variance de-
composition based on 1000 estimations of the VARs with the randomly generated
macro variables.
We ￿nd that the fraction of the variance of gross ￿ ows explained at 1 and
3-year horizons by the random innovations in the macro variables is on average
respectively 17% and 27%. For the current account these numbers are 18% and
29%. This implies that for gross capital ￿ ows the actual macro variables have
virtually no explanatory power at all as the results in Table 2 are very close to
what we would get if the macro variables were generated by pure noise. For net
capital ￿ ows we ￿nd very limited true explanatory power as the fraction of the
variance of net capital ￿ ows that can be explained by the actual macro variables
is only 16 to 24 percentage points higher than that generated by random noise.
5.2.2 Information Content of Capital Flows
We next turn to the second implication of the model. The calibration results indi-
cate that the information content of gross capital ￿ ows is stronger and more robust
than for net capital ￿ ows. It should therefore be easier to detect the information
content of gross capital ￿ ows than net capital ￿ ows. Noise in the model does not
a⁄ect gross capital ￿ ows. It only a⁄ects net capital ￿ ows and the relative asset
price, which reduces their information content. This in turn reduces the knowledge
that agents have about "D
t+1, which reduces its weight in the equilibrium relative
29asset price and net capital ￿ ows, which further reduces their information content.
This point is also illustrated in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) in the
context of a NRE model of exchange rate determination. In their benchmark
calibration the presence of dispersed information leads to a signi￿cant disconnect
between exchange rates and publicly observed fundamentals. It reduces the ex-
planatory power of observed fundamentals for one-period exchange rate changes
from close to 100% to 14%. But they ￿nd that the equilibrium exchange rate
contains only very limited information about future fundamentals. It is therefore
not surprising that evidence on the information content of exchange rates is not
overwhelming. Based on 36 bivariate Granger causality tests (6 countries and
6 di⁄erent macro variables), Engel and West (2005) ￿nd statistically signi￿cant
causality from exchange rate changes to future macro variables in only one third,
or 12, of the cases.
We conduct separate Granger causality tests for gross and net capital ￿ ows.
The theory implies that gross capital ￿ ows negatively predict future world pro-
ductivity "A
t+1 and net capital out￿ ows (or the current account) negatively predict
relative future productivity "D
t+1. The model makes no distinction between future
productivity innovations, future GDP innovations and future innovations in asset
payo⁄s. They are all driven by the same productivity shocks. However, it is pri-
vate information about future asset payo⁄s that is ultimately responsible for the
information content of asset prices and capital ￿ ows in the model. We therefore
ask to what extent capital ￿ ows Granger cause the aggregate pro￿t rate. The latter
is de￿ned as GDP minus employee compensation, divided by the capital stock.
Information Content Gross Capital Flows
The implication of the model that gross capital ￿ ows contain information about
"A
t+1 is then be tested by evaluating to what extent gross capital ￿ ows Granger cause
the ￿world pro￿t rate￿ . The latter is de￿ned as a GDP-weighted average of pro￿t
rates of all countries. We report results only for annual data as they su⁄er less
from measurement error than quarterly data.
The results are reported in Table 3. The second column reports results from
a bivariate Granger causality test. We regress the world pro￿t rate on one lag of
itself and one lag of gross capital ￿ ows. We test the null hypothesis that lagged
gross capital ￿ ows fail to cause the world pro￿t rate. Rejection of the null hypoth-
esis implies Granger causality. The table reports p-values for countries where we
30reject the null-hypothesis at a signi￿cance level of 10% or better. In four of the
six countries we ￿nd strong evidence of Granger causality. Moreover, while not
reported in the table, in each of these four cases the direction of the causality is as
predicted by the theory. The coe¢ cient on the lagged gross capital ￿ ows is always
negative.
The third and fourth columns of Table 3 con￿rm that these ￿ndings are ro-
bust to the inclusion of lagged values of other macro variables. We regress the
world pro￿t rate on its own lag and lagged values of gross capital ￿ ows and GDP-
weighted averages of a set of additional macro variables. We again test whether
the coe¢ cient on lagged gross capital ￿ ows is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. This
is the case for ￿ve of the six countries when including GDP-weighted averages of
lags of real GDP growth, in￿ ation and the T-bill rate and for four out of the six
countries when additionally including a GDP-weighted average of budget de￿cits
as a share of GDP. Moreover, in all of these cases we ￿nd that the coe¢ cient on
lagged gross capital ￿ ows is negative as predicted by the theory.30
Information Content Net Capital Flows
There is less evidence in favor of the hypothesis that net capital ￿ ows Granger
cause the relative pro￿t rate, de￿ned as the pro￿t rate minus the GDP-weighted
average pro￿t rate of the other countries. The results are reported in Table 4.
We ￿rst again conduct a bivariate Granger causality test. We regress the relative
pro￿t rate on its own lag and the lagged value of net capital out￿ ows. We ￿nd that
the coe¢ cient on the lagged pro￿t rate is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in two
of the six countries. This is the case both when measuring net capital out￿ ows as
out￿ ows minus in￿ ows and as the current account. We ￿nd even less signi￿cance
when introducing lags of other macro variables. In addition, in cases where we
do ￿nd signi￿cance the sign is positive. This is in contrast to the model, which
implies that net out￿ ows negatively predict the relative pro￿t rate.
These ￿ndings are not necessarily inconsistent with the model though. To the
contrary, they can be viewed as further con￿rmation of the theory. The calibration
exercise anticipated these results by showing that the information content of gross
capital ￿ ows is stronger and more robust than that for net capital ￿ ows. The noise
30While not reported, these results continue to hold up when we include a linear time trend in
the regressions. The justi￿cation for doing so is that gross capital ￿ ows have increased over our
sample for reasons that are unrelated to our model.
31in the model, and its interaction with private information, is responsible for the
weak information content of net capital ￿ ows.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a new theory of international capital ￿ ows based on dispersed
information. The theory is innovative in that it integrates dispersed information
into a DSGE open economy macro model with portfolio choice to develop impli-
cations for gross and net capital ￿ ows. It leads to a fundamentally di⁄erent view
of what drives both gross and net capital ￿ ows than standard models based on
common information. We have emphasized two important implications, which are
speci￿c to models with dispersed information. First, capital ￿ ows become partially
disconnected from current publicly observed fundamentals. Second, capital ￿ ows
help forecast future fundamentals, even after controlling for current fundamentals.
A calibration exercise has shown that the disconnect between capital ￿ ows
and macro variables is not very sensitive to the extent of noise in the model and
information asymmetry across countries. By contrast, the information content
of net capital ￿ ows can be signi￿cantly reduced by noise while the information
content of gross capital ￿ ows is quite robust. These implications of the theory are
con￿rmed for six industrialized countries. Publicly observed macro variables have
very limited explanatory power for both gross and net capital ￿ ows. Gross capital
￿ ows contain information about future fundamentals in the way predicted by the
theory, while net capital ￿ ows do not exhibit strong information content.
32Appendix
A Equations of the model
The various equations of the model are written in terms of the logs of the variables,
denoted by lower-case letters. We denote the worldwide average of log equity prices
by qA
t = 0:5(qH;t + qF;t), and the cross-country di⁄erence in log equity prices by
qD





t ) and asset returns (rA
t+1, rD
t+1 = ert+1).



























































































































































































































































In terms of the zero order allocation, we normalize productivity to unity in both
countries, so a(0) = 0. The relative price of capital is unity, implying q (0) = 0.
The zero order components of the rate of return, capital and consumption of young
agents are:
e
r(0) = (1 ￿ !)e













￿!k(0) + (1 ￿ ￿)
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cy(0)￿(1￿!)k(0) = 1 ￿
e!k(0)
!
The average portfolio share is computed from the asset market clearing (48):
z
A (0) =







We focus on the signal extraction of Home investors. The inference for Foreign
investors is computed along similar lines.
34A Home investor infers the Home and Foreign future productivity shocks, "H
t+1
and "F
t+1 from three types of signals. The ￿rst is the relative asset price, qD
t , which
together with the publicly observed state variables (22) reveals xD
t from (21). The









The signal extraction problem therefore consists of inferring a vector ￿t+1 =
j"H;t+1;"F;t+1j



















where XH is a 5 by 2 matrix and v
Hj
t is a vector of independent innovations with
a diagonal variance matrix RH:
X
H =
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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The projection theorem implies that ￿t+1 is then normally distributed with mean






































































































































































































While these coe¢ cients are complex functions, we can distinguish between their


























































































































































































































































Variance of productivity shocks














































































































































C First order solution
We now describe the ￿rst-order solution of all variables other than the di⁄erence
zD
t in portfolio shares. We leave the second-order solution to a Technical Appendix

























































The solution in terms for the worldwide averages of consumption, equity prices
and capital dynamics is computed by taking linear expansions of the equations
(42)-(53). We then taking worldwide averages of the relations for the Home and
Foreign country, before computing expectations using the results from signal ex-
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and ￿4;kA (0) 2 (0;1) in (58) is the root of the polynomial:
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For cross-country di⁄erences in equations the approach is the same as for world-
wide averages of equations: ￿rst take linear expansions of the equations (42)-(53).
We then take the cross-country di⁄erences, and compute expectations using the




t (1) = ￿1;qD (0)a
D
t (1) + ￿3;qD (0)k
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1 ￿ rq + rq￿1;qD (0)





The coe¢ cient ￿5;qD (0) in (59)-(62) is de￿ned conditional on ￿, which we still have
to solve for.
To solve for ￿ , we ￿rst take the third-order component of the optimal portfolio
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We can undertake similar steps for the optimal portfolio condition for a Foreign
investor (47). Averaging across investors and taking the average of these relations














































































































































(3)dj. Similarly ￿ EF
t denotes the average expectation
across Foreign investors.
We can infer ￿ by using (62) to substitute for zA
t (1) in (63). Both zA
t (1) in (62)
and the terms on the right hand side of (63) (which are computed in the Technical
Appendix available on request) depend on xD
t (1). ￿D
t (3) only enters in the second
row of (63). Therefore (63) can only hold when "D
t+1 also enters (63) and in a way
that is proportional to xD
t (1) when combined with the term in ￿D
t (3).
"D
























The only component of this that matters is the one that is proportional in "D
t+1.

















t ("H;t+1 ￿ "F;t+1)
i
(3) is given by (54). We can undertake similar steps
for a Foreign investors. Aggregating across individual investors, and again ab-































































The ratio between the coe¢ cient on "D
t+1 and the coe¢ cient on ￿D
t (3) must be the
same as in xD
t (1), implying:
















41The left-hand side of (64) is an increasing linear function of ￿ which is ￿ atter the
higher the variance of the errors of the private signals. The right-hand side of
(64) is decreasing function of ￿ that is in￿nite when ￿ ! 0 and converges to ￿=￿2
a
when ￿ ! 1. (64) therefore gives an implicit solution for ￿. Combining it with
(59)-(62) gives the ￿rst-order solution for the model.
After computing the terms on the right hand side of (63), done in the Technical
































We solve for zD (0) = zH (0)￿zF (0) by taking the second-order component of




































We can undertake similar steps for the optimal portfolio condition for a Foreign
investor (47). After summing across investors and taking the di⁄erence between


































































a (1 ￿ rq + rq￿1;qD (0))
2 ￿
42where ￿ 2 [0;1] is an increasing function of ￿ that converges to one when private
signals are in￿nitely noisy (￿ ! 1):































The ￿rst-order component of the di⁄erence in portfolio shares is solved by
taking the average over Home investors of the third-order component of the optimal
portfolio condition (46) and substracting the average across Foreign investors of


































































































































Using the results for both the ￿rst and second-order solution of all variables other
than zD
t , we compute the various terms on the right hand side of this expression







































= [vart (ert+1)](3) are given
by (33) and (34).
43E Balance of Payments Accounting
Saving and investment
Saving is equal to income minus consumption. National savings in the Home
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t (1) is scaled by the steady state wealth: si
t (1) = Si
t (1)=(W (0)(1 ￿ ￿ c)).
In addition for a variable g: ￿gt (1)=gt (1) ￿ gt￿1 (1). Using (56) and (60), the
￿rst-order component of consumption is
￿c
H






















Savings in a speci￿c country are then a⁄ected by information dispersion only
through relative equity prices:
s
H
















t (1) = ￿a
D
t (1) + (1 ￿ !)￿k
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t (1) = sH
t (1) ￿ sF
t (1).
Investment is also de￿ned net of depreciation:
I
net
i;t = Ii;t ￿ ￿Ki;t￿1 = Ki;t ￿ Ki;t￿1 i = H;F
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where we used (5).
Capital ￿ ows
The passive portfolio share combines the steady-state holdings of quantities of





zH (0)eqH;t + (1 ￿ zH (0))eqF;t
The ￿rst-order component of the passive portfolio share is the same for all investors
and re￿ ects the relative asset price between Home and Foreign equity:
z
p
t (1) = zH (0)(1 ￿ zH (0))q
D
t (1)
Using the di⁄erence between the ￿rst-order components of (48) and (49) we get:
￿z
A













Gross capital out￿ ows and in￿ ows re￿ ect the changes in the value of cross-









































45The ￿rst-order component of out￿ ows, scaled by steady-state wealth W (0)(1 ￿ ￿ c),
is:
outflowst (1) = ￿(1 ￿ zH (0))￿qF;t (1) ￿ ￿zH;t (1)
+
1 ￿ zH (0)
1 ￿ ￿ c
￿











































































Similarly, in￿ ows are:























































Here follows a description of the data used in section 5.
Capital Flows: Quarterly data on capital ￿ ows are obtained from the IMF Inter-
national Financial Statistics (IFS). Capital out￿ ows are computed as the sum of
direct investment abroad, portfolio investment assets and other investment assets.
Capital in￿ ows are the sum of direct investment liabilities, portfolio investment
liabilities and other investment liabilities. Net capital ￿ ows is alternatively com-
puted as capital out￿ ows minus in￿ ows or the current account (also from the IFS).
All capital ￿ ow data are converted from dollars to the local currency by multiply-
ing with the quarterly exchange rate (IFS), and are scaled by the gross domestic
product (IFS, seasonally adjusted). When computing annual net and gross capital
46￿ ows we ￿rst aggregate over the quarterly data before dividing by annual GDP.
These data are used in the VAR analysis and Granger causality tests.
interest rates: We use the Treasury bill rate from the IFS, with the exception
of France, where the short-term rate from the OECD Economic Outlook is used.
The latter is very close to the Treasury bill rate from the IFS, but that series is not
available after Q3, 2004. Annual interest rates are computed by averaging over the
quarterly data. These data are used in the VAR analysis and Granger causality
tests.
real GDP growth: Quarterly real GDP growth is computed as the change in
the log seasonally adjusted GDP volume from the IFS. Annual GDP growth is
based on annual GDP volume data from the IFS. These data are used in the VAR
analysis and Granger causality tests.
real investment growth: Annual investment growth is computed as the growth
rate of annual total gross ￿xed capital formation (volume) from the OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook. These data are used in the calibration of the model, which matches
the standard deviation of average real investment growth relative to annual real
GDP growth, with the latter also computed with OECD Economic Outlook data.
in￿ ation: Quarterly in￿ ation is computed as the quarterly change in the log CPI
from the IFS. Annual in￿ ation is computed after ￿rst averaging the price indices
for each quarter. These data are used in the VAR analysis and Granger causality
tests.
budget de￿cit: We use quarterly data on government net lending as a percentage
of GDP, from the OECD Economic Outlook, as a measure of the budget de￿cit.
These data are not available for Germany and France, for which we therefore omit
the budget de￿cit from the quarterly VAR analysis. Annual data are available
from the OECD Economic Outlook for all countries and are used in the annual
VAR analysis and Granger causality test.
pro￿t rate: The annual pro￿t rate is computed as nominal GDP minus employee
compensation, divided by the value of the capital stock. The latter is computed as
the product of the volume of the capital stock for the total economy and the de￿ ator
of total gross ￿xed capital formation. All data are from the OECD Economic
Outlook. These data are used in the Granger causality tests.
47labor share: The labor share is computed as the ratio of total employee compen-
sation to nominal GDP, both from the OECD Economic Outlook. These data are
used for the calibration of the model, which matches the average labor share in
the data.
Solow Residual: Annual Solow residuals are computed using data on GDP vol-
ume, total employment and the volume of the capital stock for the total economy,
all from the OECD Economic Outlook. The log Solow residual is then computed
as ait = yit ￿!nit ￿(1￿!)kit, where yit, nit and kit are respectively log GDP, log
employment and log capital stock and ! is the estimated labor share. These data
are used to compute the persistence of ait in the calibration of the model.
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σHF/σHH θTable 1.  Percentage Variance of Gross and Net Capital Flows Accounted for by  
                Macro Fundamentals: Quarterly  Data, 1977(1)-2007(2) 
 
Capital flow measure  Outflows+Inflows (% GDP)  Current Account (% GDP) 
Horizon  1 quarter  4 quarters  12 quarters  1 quarter  4 quarters  12 quarters 
United  States  4  11 16 17 36 48 
Japan  1 9 14 5 37  55 
Canada  4 18 22 4 18  35 
United  Kingdom  11 14 18  9  10 13 
Germany  13 10 16  5  22 33 
France  2 7 11 2 6 10 
Average  6 12 16 7 22  32 
 
Notes. The table reports the contribution of macro variables to gross and net capital flows. It is based on a VAR of real 
GDP growth, the inflation rate, the T-bill rate, the budget deficit as a fraction of GDP and the measure of gross or net 
capital flows in the first row of the table (as fraction of GDP).  Identification is achieved using the Cholesky decomposition 
with the ordering of the variables as in the previous sentence. For VARs including gross capital flows (sum of capital 
inflows and outflows), the macro-variables are computed as a GDP-weighted average of the six countries in the sample. 
For the VARs including net capital flows (the current account), the macro-variables equal to that variable in the country 
minus a GDP-weighted average of that in the other countries. The results are based on 122 quarterly observations from 
1977(1) to 2007(2), with three lags of each variable. The table reports the total contribution of innovations of all four 



























Table 2.  Percentage Variance of Gross and Net Capital Flows Accounted for by  
                Macro Fundamentals: Annual  Data, 1977-2006 
 
Capital flow measure  Outflows+Inflows (%GDP)  Current Account (%GDP) 
Horizon  1 year  2 years  3 years  1 year  2 years  3 years 
United  States  33 38 47 53 63 69 
Japan  10 20 32 51 55 56 
Canada  35 39 40 44 61 68 
United  Kingdom  10 10 17 10 25 33 
Germany  25 29 34 28 56 65 
France  10  7  7  16 22 26 
Average  21 24 30 34 47 53 
 
Notes. The table reports the contribution of macro variables to gross and net capital flows. It is based on a VAR  of real 
GDP growth, the inflation rate, the T-bill rate, the budget deficit as a fraction of GDP and the measure of gross or net 
capital flows in the first row of the table (as fraction of GDP).  Identification is achieved using the Cholesky decomposition 
with the ordering of the variables as in the previous sentence. For VARs including gross capital flows (sum of capital 
inflows and outflows), the macro-variables are computed as a GDP-weighted average of the six countries in the sample. 
For the VARs including net capital flows (the current account), the macro-variables equal to that variable in the country 
minus a GDP-weighted average of that in the other countries. The results are based on 30 annual observations from 1977 to 
2006, with one lag of each variable. The table reports the total contribution of innovations of all four macro fundamentals 
























Table 3.   Granger Causality Test of “World Profit Rate” by    
                 Capital Inflows+Outflows (% GDP): Annual Data, 1977-2006 
 











United States  - 2.9  - 
Japan  - -  - 
Canada  0.1 0.2  4.5 
United Kingdom  2.3 1.3  6.9 
Germany   2.9 0.0  4.7 
France  1.7 0.4  9.4 
# significant at 10%  4 5  4 
 
Notes. The table reports p-values (in %) from the F-test that the sum of inflows and outflows (as a fraction 
of GDP) does not  Granger cause the world profit rate. A value of 2.5 for example indicates that the null of 
no Granger causality is rejected at the 2.5% level. The wor1d profit rate  is defined as a GDP-weighted 
average of profit rates of all 6 countries. The profit rate is equal to GDP minus employee compensation, 
divided by the capital stock. The table only reports p-values for countries where there is significance at the 
10% level or better. The multivariate Granger Causality test results in columns 3 and 4  introduce GDP 
weighted averages of respectively 3 and 4 control variables. In column 3 they are real GDP growth, the T-
bill rate and the CPI inflation rate. In column 4 the budget deficit as a share of GDP is an additional control 



















Table 4.  Granger Causality Test of “Relative Profit Rate” by Net Capital Flows:   
                Annual Data, 1977-2006. 
 
  Bivariate Multivariate 
Control variables    Relative GDP growth, 
interest rate, inflation 
Relative GDP growth, interest 
rate, inflation, budget deficit 
Capital flow measure  CA 
outflows-
inflows  CA 
outflows-
inflows  CA 
outflows-
inflows 
United States  - - -  -  - - 
Japan  - - -  -  - - 
Canada  - - -  -  - - 
United Kingdom  1.3 1.6 1.0 -  2.8  - 
Germany   - - -  -  - - 
France  3.5 5.0  -  -  -  - 
# significant at 10%  2 2 1  0  1 0 
 
Notes. The table reports p-values (in %) from the F-test that net capital flows do not Granger cause the relative profit rate. 
A value of 2.5 for example indicates that the null of no Granger causality is rejected at the 2.5% level. The relative profit 
rate is defined as the profit rate in a country relative to a GDP-weighted average of that in the other countries. The profit 
rate is equal to GDP minus employee compensation, divided by the capital stock. The table only reports p-values for 
countries where there is significance at the 10% level or better. The multivariate Granger Causality test results in columns 
3 and 4  introduce respectively 3 and 4 control variables. In column 3 they are real GDP growth, the T-bill rate and the CPI 
inflation rate. In column 4 the budget deficit as a share of GDP is an additional control variable. All control variables are 
relative to a GDP weighted average of that in the other countries. The results are based on annual data from 1977 to 2006 
with one lag for all variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 